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* Professor of Law and the Founding Director of the Law School’s Intellectual Property
Law Program (2002–2007). He dedicates this chapter to his mother, Anita Greenberg, who
fondly remembersMy Sister Eileen.
1. Kurlan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 40 Cal. 2d 799 (1953).
Kurlan v. CBS: Justice
Carter’s Prescient Dissent—
A Glimpse into the Future of
Copyright Protection in the
Entertainment Industry
By Marc H. Greenberg*
Introduction
A scholar of intellectual property law quickly learns that complacency, and
the privilege of working in a largely static and unchanging body of law, is not
a benefit available to those who labor in this endlessly fascinating but fast-
paced and always changing field. The 1953 decision of the California Supreme
Court in Kurlan v. CBS1 (hereinafter “Kurlan”), provides yet another example
of this principle. Many of the assumptions found in the majority decision have
long been abandoned or substantially revised.
Justice Carter’s dissent, however, contains the seeds of those revisions, and is
prescient in its understanding of the need to: 1) eliminate copyright formalities
regarding whether a work is deemed“published” resulting in divestiture of own-
ership; 2) determine whether characters should be separately subject to copyright
protection; and 3) confirm that the judiciary should interpret and limit licenses
of works to the media platform identified in the license, rather than affording a
multi-platform license to licensees to the detriment of copyright holders.
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2. Id. at 801. Additional background facts are drawn from the case summary in Kurlan
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 343 F. 2d 625, 627 (1965) (hereinafter “Kurlan Tax Case”).
A discussion of the relation of this case to the Kurlan case is found in note 26 and accom-
panying text, infra.
3. Id. at 804. Interestingly, Kurlan had cast Lucille Ball, then known primarily as a movie
actress, who was under contract to him, for the role of Ruth. Id.Her later work in the long
running series of shows she did with Desi Arnaz cast her in the screwball comedy part more
in league with the character of Eileen.
4. Id. While the reader may cringe at the sexism of a term like “man-crazy,” it is prob-
ably fair to say that this kind of plot-line can still be found in any number of television net-
work situation comedies still popular in the present era, viz Sex in the City, Lipstick Jungle,
and The Cashmere Mafia, to name a few.
5. See Kurlan Tax Case, 343 F. 2d at 625.
Background: The Tale of Two Stories,
and the Majority’s Decision
Arthur Kurlan was a California-based independent writer and producer of
motion pictures, television and radio shows during the 1940s and 50s. In the
early 1940s he became interested in a popular book written by Ruth McKenny,
entitledMy Sister Eileen, which had spawned a popular theatrical production
that ran on Broadway, a motion picture photoplay, as well as other copyrighted
writings, which had also featured the main characters from the book.2 These
characters were Ruth and Eileen, two sisters living in an apartment in New
York City. Ruth is described as having average intelligence, and is the more
sober, “balance wheel” of the pair, while Eileen is described as “semi-moronic,
scatterbrained, impulsive, naive, completely thoughtless and oblivious to the
consequences of most of her acts.”3 Most of those acts arose from what was
characterized as Eileen’s condition of being “man-crazy,” which led her to get
involved in a series of scrapes and situations which also involved Ruth, and
which Ruth had to extricate the two of them from, much to her embarrassment.4
Kurlan wanted to obtain the rights toMy Sister Eileen to create a serial radio
or television program using the Ruth and Eileen characters, and adding in sev-
eral background characters of his own creation. These were two media areas
where the characters and story had not been presented. In March 1946, he en-
tered into a license agreement with Ruth McKenny in which she assigned the
radio and television rights to her stories and characters to him.5
Kurlan produced, for audition purposes, a wax recording for a radio pro-
gram utilizing the McKenny characters, and submitted it in June 1946, to the
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) for consideration of their acquisition of
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6. Id. at 627.
7. See Kurlan, 40 Cal. 2d at 803 (quoting Kurlan’s complaint).
8. See Kurlan Tax Case, 343 F. 2d at 627.
9. See Kurlan, 40 Cal. 2d at 804–05.
10. Id. at 803.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 803.
13. Id. at 803. This seems a bit of a harsh result, since California courts liberally con-
strue pleadings, and generally grant leave to amend in response to a first demurrer. See, e.g.
Robert I. Weil, Ira A. Brown, Jr. &William F. Rylaarsdam, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Be-
fore Trial Ch. 7:131, Comment (2008) (“Leave to amend (i.e., to cure the defect) will al-
most certainly be granted.”). Kurlan made the argument that the trial court’s refusal to allow
him to amend was an abuse of discretion: however, this issue was not addressed by the
the program.6 According to Kurlan, after extensive negotiation, CBS declined
to acquire the program, and instead informed Kurlan that they “ ‘intended to
use’ ” his idea, characters, and format “ ‘without compensation therefore by
merely changing the names of the characters and describing the leading fe-
male characters as girl friends instead of sisters’ ”; and, in this way, CBS in-
tended to be free of any obligation to pay Kurlan for the rights to the work.7
A month later CBS announced its forthcoming new radio and television show,
entitledMy Friend Irma, a show CBS ultimately released in both of those for-
mats in April 1947.8
The plot-line ofMy Friend Irma featured two women, Irma and Jane, who
are roommates, not sisters, living in NewYork City. Jane is a smart woman, while
Irma is characterized as being “stupid.” Irma gets the two women into trouble
due to her stupid antics, and Jane tries to get them out of trouble, with each
episode reaching, as was common for that era, a happy ending.9
Kurlan filed suit against CBS in state court in Los Angeles, California.10 He
alleged a variety of claims, including that theMy Friend Irma productions vi-
olated an implied agreement between him and CBS, that CBS would pay him
if it used his program idea.11 An additional count alleged violation of indus-
try custom and practice that CBS would not be allowed to use any part of
Kurlan’s program without his consent, and yet another count raised claims in
tort for the misappropriation of Kurlan’s personal property, consisting of his
radio program idea and format.12
CBS responded to the complaint by filing a demurrer, arguing that the var-
ious counts of Kurlan’s complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute valid
causes of action. The trial court agreed, and sustained the demurrers without
leave to amend.13 Kurlan appealed the subsequent judgment against him, and
the California Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, reversed the Los Ange-
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Supreme Court since it reversed the trial court on other grounds. See Kurlan, 40 Cal. 2d at
811.
14. See Kurlan, 40 Cal. 2d at 811.While the case was pending in the Superior Court on
remand from the Supreme Court, a settlement was negotiated between Kurlan andMcKenny
on the one hand, and CBS on the other. CBS paid a total of $75,000 to Kurlan in return for
a release, from both Kurlan and McKenney, of all claims, whether for violation of literary
property, infringement of copyright, or breach of contract, arising from CBS’ past or fur-
ther production ofMy Friend Irma, and of a dismissal of the action with prejudice. Kurlan
Tax Case, 343 F. 2d at 628.
15. See Kurlan, 40 Cal. 2d at 801–11.
16. Id. at 811–12.
17. Id. at 812–15.
18. Id. at 815–23.
19. Id. at 807.
20. Id.; see also Cal. Civ. Code §983 (West 2007) (In 1949 the existing section became
subd. (a) and subd. (b) was added, a 1982 amendment deleted subd. (a), and the subdivi-
sion designations). It is important to note that the publication, in order to forfeit control
over rights of reproduction, must be intentional. Id. An analogous situation would be plac-
ing a software program or similar content into a “freeware” site.
les County Superior Court, and remanded the case with instructions that CBS
would now have to answer the complaint.14
The issues in the case, while it was an appeal, proved daunting for the Supreme
Court, which was unable to muster a unified majority. Instead, the first section
of the Supreme Court’s opinion was written by Justice Edmonds, in which he was
joined by Chief Justice Gibson and Justice Shenk.15 Justice Schauer wrote a brief
concurrence.16 Justice Traynor wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Spence joined, agreeing with the conclusion that the breach of contract claim
survived the demurrer, but disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion that the
plagiarism claim should also survive.17 Finally, Justice Carter dissented, concur-
ring with the result, but rejecting the rationale of the other two justices.18
The majority opinion acknowledged and agreed with the trial court’s de-
termination that a key point in CBS’ favor is the fact that in allowing her book,
and the play and movie based on it, to be published, the provisions of section
983 of the California Civil Code mandated that protection of the core dra-
matic aspects of Ruth McKenny’s work had been lost to the public domain.19
This Code section provided and still provides: “[i]f the owner of a product of
the mind intentionally makes it public, a copy or reproduction may be made
public by any person, without responsibility to the owner, so far as the law of
this state is concerned.”20
The trial court found that having allowed her story to be published first as
a book, then as a play and a motion picture, McKenny had, for purposes of Sec-
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21. See Kurlan, 40 Cal. 2d at 807.
22. Id. at 809.
23. Id. at 810.
24. Id. at 811.
25. Id. at 814–15. Justice Traynor felt that a companion section of the Civil Code, §980,
which required protection for works that remained in the author’s physical possession,
meant that even unpublished works “might be lost by a transfer of possession of the man-
uscript even without actual publication.” Id. at 814. Given that §983 refers to the inten-
tional publication of a work as the trigger for a loss of protection, it seems reasonable to assume
that Justice Traynor, in making this observation, was also speaking of intentional transfers
of unpublished works, an act which usually results in loss of ownership per the “work for
tion 983, intentionally allowed her literary property to go into the public do-
main. As such, the majority held, “[t]herefore, as a matter of law, there is no
protectible property in the ‘basic dramatic core’ of the story, its characters and
their relationships, or the form and manner of its expression.”21 This left, there-
fore, very little content in Kurlan’s radio show that would be entitled to any pro-
tection.
The majority opinion did, however, note that Kurlan pled ownership of a
new radio production format and radio production idea. Acknowledging that
the radio industry was complicated, and that it was beyond the ability of the
court to take judicial notice of all of the different ways a radio program could
be presented, the Court found that it could not have been determined by the
trial court, upon demurrer, that there was no protectable property in those
formats and ideas, and for that reason held that the demurrers could not prop-
erly have been sustained.22
This same rationale was applied by the majority to the rest of the causes of
action in Kurlan’s complaint. The Court found that the plagiarism count should
not have been dismissed, as evidence might exist that the program format was
new and original, and that the concepts in the two programs, each involving
a “smart” girl and a “dumb” girl, sharing an apartment in New York, “present
questions of fact for a jury as to the contractual provisions, access, similarity
and copying.”23
In accordance with this reasoning, Justices Edmonds, Gibson, and Shenk,
ordered the trial court decision reversed as to each cause of action. The mat-
ter was remanded with directions to permit the defendants to answer.24
Justice Traynor concurred with the result on the grounds that Kurlan should
be allowed to proceed with the litigation based on his breach of contract claim
(whether implied or express), but dissented with respect to the majority’s sug-
gestion that any portion of the literary rights held by McKenney were pro-
tectible, per Section 983, once they had been intentionally published.25
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hire” doctrine under Federal Copyright law. Currently 17 U.S.C. §201(b) (2006). See also
Cal. Civ. Code §983(b) (West 1953) (“intentionally”).
Justice Carter dissented, and in his dissent, offered a strong criticism of the
majority’s rationale, as well as Justice Traynor’s dissent. His arguments, while
not embraced by his colleagues on the bench, signaled the approach later courts
and the legislature would take on these critical issues in intellectual property
law.
DISSENT
Carter, J. I dissent.
I concur in the reversal of the judgment but I cannot concur in the greater
part of the reasoning and law propounded in the majority opinion.
It is stated by the majority that “Kurlan’s complaint shows that any prop-
erty interest which McKenney may have had in either the story or charac-
ters of ‘My Sister Eileen’ has been lost by publication.” The pleading shows
that the story and characters were made public in a play, picture, magazines
and books. It also shows that the stories had never been presented on the
air and that by written agreement plaintiff ’s assignor had expressly reserved
the sole and exclusive right to use for radio broadcasting purposes these
leading female characters. “The owner of the common-law copyright has a
perpetual right of property and the exclusive right of first general publica-
tion, and may, prior thereto, enjoy the benefit of a restricted publication
without forfeiture of the right of general publication. Thus, he may com-
municate the contents of his work under restrictions without forfeiture of
the right. This communication of contents under restriction, is known as a re-
stricted or limited publication.” (Emphasis added; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,
147 F. 15, 18.). . .
“It is well settled that the public performance of a dramatic or musical com-
position is merely a limited publication which does not confer upon the hearer
or spectator any title to the manuscript, or any right to a copy which may have
been obtained surreptitiously, or which may have come into his possession ac-
cidentally; because only a publication of the manuscript will amount to an
abandonment of the rights of the author and a consequent transfer of them to
the public domain, and no such publication occurs as long as the author exercises
control over his manuscript, or has a right to such control. (Crowe v. Aiken,
Fed.Cas. 3441; Keene v. Clark, 5 Robertson (28 N.Y. Super.Ct.) 38; Keene v.
Kimball, 16 Gray (Mass.) 545, 77 Am.Dec. 426; Brown v. Ferris, 122 Misc. 418,
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204 N.Y.S. 190.) Consequently a special public use of it by the author for his
own benefit is no evidence of abandonment of his property therein, because
such a use is entirely consistent with his exclusive right to its control. Thus,
the reading, recital or stage representation of a manuscript play in public for
profit, with the consent of the author, does not constitute any evidence of
abandonment to the public of any rights arising from the authorship of the
play; nor does it deprive him of his right to copyright the play. (Boucicault v.
Fox, 3 Fed.Cas. 977.)
. . . .
If the author of a play were not entitled to claim the protection of the law to
secure to him the profits resulting from public performances of his composition, drama-
tists would soon cease to write plays for the amusement and entertainment of the
public, unless subsidized by government or aided by private patronage: for the
revenue derived from the sale of published copies of a popular drama would be neg-
ligible in comparison with the box-office receipts. (Werckmeister v. American Litho.
Co., 134 F. 321 [69 C.C.A. 553, 68 L.R.A. 591].)
. . . .
“Where the intent of the owner is to give the public merely a right to a lim-
ited use of his literary property or to use it in a particular way, the owner’s act
does not constitute an abandonment of all his property; but the public acquires
a right to use it only to the extent of the dedication. (Aronson v. Baker, 43 N.J.Eq.
365, 12 A. 177.)” (Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary Property, 1944, §61, p.
135.) (Emphasis added.)
It is common practice to reserve the dramatizing rights on the sale of a book
and these rights are respected and upheld by the courts. (Ford v. Charles E.
Blaney Amusement Co., 148 F. 642). Section 1(b) of the 1909 Copyright Act ex-
pressly confers upon the copyright proprietor the exclusive right to transform
the work by translation, dramatization, adaptation, and by making other ver-
sions embodying material and substantial parts of the original in order to en-
able the author to reap the profits of his work in every field of intellectual
property in which it can be exploited advantageously by vending copies or by
public performance for profit. (O’Neill v. General Film Co., 157 N.Y.S. 1028). This
section has been literally construed by the courts to cover any adaptation of a
literary work which tells the same story as the original, whether the resulting drama
be adapted for presentation in the form of a stage play or for exhibition on the
screen (Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros, 222 U.S. 55 [56 L.Ed. 92, Ann.Cas. 1913A
1285]; International Film S. Co. v. Affiliated Distributors, 283 F. 229).
For the purpose of the demurrer, all allegations of the complaint must be
taken as true. It is alleged in the complaint here that on or about the 11th day
of March, 1946, RuthMcKenney and plaintiff entered into an agreement in writ-
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ing, wherein Ruth McKenney did grant to plaintiff the sole and exclusive right
to use for radio broadcasting purposes the leading female characters created by
her and featured or portrayed in “said stories, stage play and motion picture
entitled ‘My Sister Eileen,’ and said Ruth McKenney did furthermore grant to
said plaintiff Arthur Kurlan all radio broadcasting rights therein and thereto
which had theretofore been expressly reserved by said Ruth McKenney in connec-
tion with each and all of said prior licenses and uses of said characters in con-
nection with said stories, play and motion picture hereinbefore mentioned.”
(Emphasis added.) It is further alleged that after the expiration of the original
term of the agreement the time was extended by the parties, Ruth McKenney
and plaintiff; that Ruth McKenney reserved and retained the right to receive
royalties in connection with the production of any and all radio programs li-
censed under the agreement. Hence, plaintiff ’s assignor reserved all radio rights
in the two leading characters, and it cannot be true, as is stated in the major-
ity opinion, that “as a matter of law, there is no protectible property in the
‘basic dramatic core’ of the story, its characters and their relationships, or the
form and manner of its expression” because there has been a publication. The
allegations of the complaint show that the publication was a limited one with
certain rights reserved.
It has been recognized that different types of rights may be reserved in lit-
erary works and that publication may be restricted so as to preserve those
rights. See Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 262 F. 811; L. C. Page &
Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196; Gogniat v. Universal Pictures Corp., 35 U.S.
Pat.Q. 117; Casino Productions v. Vitaphone Corp., 163 Misc. 403 [295 N.Y.S.
501]; (remaining citations omitted).
At the time Kurlan’s cause of action arose, §980 of the Civil Code provided
protection for “any product of the mind ... and in the representation or expression
thereof.” (Emphasis added.) The majority says, however, that the two leading
characters involved were unoriginal and unworthy of protection inasmuch as
any property right in them had been lost by publication. As I have heretofore
stated, it is my opinion that the publication was a limited one, with the radio
rights expressly reserved and that there was a protectible property interest in-
volved. The statute reads, for our purposes, as it did when this court decided
Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690 [221 P.2d 95], wherein a basic,
dramatic core with one important dramatic figure was held to constitute a pro-
tectible interest.
Characters and characterizations which are products of the mind should be
held to be protectible property interests. The radio industry is a large one, and
radio programs are frequently based upon a single character, personality or
characterization. To illustrate the extremely valuable theatrical-radio proper-
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* Sherlock Holmes; The Thin Man; The Fat Man; Michael Shane; Count of Monte
Cristo; Crime Doctor; The Whistler; Mr. District Attorney; A Date with Judy; Adventures
of Bulldog Drummond; Adventures of Ellery Queen; Adventures of the Falcon; Jack Arm-
strong; Blondie; Captain Midnight; The Lone Ranger; Stella Dallas; Ma Perkins; The Great
Gildersleeve; Perry Mason; Superman; Young Dr. Malone; The Cisco Kid; Fibber McGee and
Molly; Mr. and Mrs. North; One Man’s Family; The Aldrich Family; Amos ‘n’ Andy; Edgar
Bergen and Charlie McCarthy; Burns and Allen; and many others. (Footnote from the orig-
inal dissent of Justice Carter).
ties which are in existence one only must look as far as the radio column in his
daily paper to note the programs, built around a single character, or family, which
continue from day to day, week to week, and year to year.* It should be ap-
parent to even the least intelligent that these programs are as valuable as the
most gilt-edged security listed on the Stock Exchange. No court would hesi-
tate to extend its protection to the lawful owner of a security, and yet equally
valuable “character-types” are not given the same protection. It is surely a sub-
ject of judicial notice that California is the center of the motion picture in-
dustry of the world and if its laws are inadequate for the protection of the
individual creative writer who must find a market for his work, then those
laws should be amended. It is axiomatic that the movie industry could not
exist without the writer and yet, if the present trend continues, the writer will
vanish from the scene. The same is true of the radio industry. A writer submits
his work to either industry in the hope and rightful expectation that if his work
is used, he will be paid its value, but, under presently existing conditions, and
court decisions, these industries may make minor changes in the play, or man-
uscript, and escape liability and any obligation to pay any consideration there-
for. As Goldsmith wrote (Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning) as
an epitaph to the memory of his friend, Ned Purdon, an author:
“Here lies poor Ned Purdon, from misery freed,
Who long was a bookseller’s hack;
He led such a damnable life in this world,
I don’t think he’ll wish to come back!”
The statement attributed to Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
35 Cal.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216], found in the majority opin-
ion here is misleading so far as this case is concerned. That statement is
“Kurlan’s radio program idea was to capitalize upon a famous and success-
ful story, play and motion picture by producing it on the radio. The court may
take judicial notice of the fact that there is nothing new and novel in this
idea which might constitute protectible property.” We said there that there
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was “nothing new in a play broadcast over the air.” There is nothing new in
a play broadcast over the air, but there is something new in a play broadcast
by someone else over the air for the first time if the author of that play has
reserved the radio rights thereto, because the play is being used in a medium
new to it. . . .
Section 426(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure now provides that the copy
of the production as to which the infringement is claimed and a copy of the
alleged infringing production must be attached to the complaint. This permits
the trial court, upon demurrer, to decide in the first instance whether or not
there is similarity between the two productions. Heretofore, the question of sim-
ilarity has been considered to be one of fact (Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216]; Golding v. R.K.O.
Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690 [221 P.2d 95]); (remaining citations omitted) and
the test to be that impression received by the average reasonable man upon a
comparative reading of the two works. There should be no change in the test
to be used under the new code section. It should still be that of the reasonable
man. In other words, if reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not there
is similarity between the two works, then the question is still one of fact for the jury.
. . . .
The briefs show that in describing the radio program entitled “My Friend
Irma,” the New York Herald-Tribune, on March 22, 1948, stated in a dramatic
criticism and review of the program: “The central idea, that of two young girl
roommates, one bright, the other one almost intolerably innocent of all knowl-
edge, was taken almost intact from a very funny play entitled ‘My Sister Eileen.’ ”
(Emphasis added.) The question of similarity between the two productions is
most assuredly one on which reasonable minds might differ as can be seen
from the above quoted dramatic review and the fact that three justices of the
District Court of Appeal (see (Cal.App.) 233 P.2d 936) as well as myself feel
that within the common knowledge of the average reader, observer, spectator
or listener there are sufficient similarities to induce the belief that copying has
taken place. It is true that there are differences between the two programs, but
as Mr. Justice Edmonds said in the Golding case “such differences go to the
quality of the plagiarism, and not to its existence or nonexistence.” (Golding v.
R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 699 [221 P.2d 95].)
No test other than the reasonable minds one has ever been laid down for de-
termining the question of similarity between the alleged infringed and in-
fringing productions and there is no reason why, in determining the matter
upon a demurrer, the trial court should apply any other rule. As I read the
majority opinion in this case and in that of Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, ante, p. 778
[256 P.2d 947] (this day filed) I do not find that any test has been proposed
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26. See The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §101 (2008)); William F. Patry, 5 Patry on Copyright §18:3 (2008) (discussing
the 1909 Act; the 1909 dual system of state law protection for unpublished (“private”)
and federal protection for published works); §2:2 (comparing the 1909 and 1976 Acts);
see also 17 U.S.C.A. §301 (West 2008) (Historical and Statutory notes discuss the 1976
Act).
27. See Kurlan Tax Case, at 343 F. 2d at 625.
other than that of “substantial similarity.” InWeitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, it is
said “if some substantial similarity between the compositions reasonably could
be found, the issues of similarity and of copying are to be determined by the
trier of the fact” and in the instant case it is said that “If, from a comparison
of the productions, a question of fact is shown to exist, the cause should be sub-
mitted to the jury.” In my opinion, these statements are not the equivalent of
saying that the question is one for the jury if reasonable minds could differ on
whether or not the two productions are similar.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial court to overrule
the demurrer as to all counts and permit defendants to answer if they be so
advised.
Comment
A Copyright Case in State Court
Any contemporary student or scholar of intellectual property law, com-
ing upon the decision in Kurlan v. CBS, will immediately wonder why the
case was filed, and remained, in the state court system. Federal Copyright
Law, both in the 1909 and 1976 versions of the Act, have always maintained
a pre-emption doctrine, found in Section 301 of the Act, which provides
that actions based on copyright ownership fall within the exclusive juris-
diction of the federal court system.26 There is no reference in the decision
of the majority, or in any of the concurring opinions or in Justice Carter’s
dissent that provide any clues to the answer to this mysterious decision by
Kurlan and his counsel to eschew the use of the federal courts and Copyright
law in this case.
However, the decision in the tax case filed ten years after the CBS case does
contain some clues that offer at least partial explanation for the choice of
venue.27 In its discussion of the facts and procedural history of the case, the Court
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28. Id. at 629–30.
29. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F. 3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003).
of Appeals opinion, written by Circuit Judge Friendly, offered a possible rea-
son why the case was not filed in a federal court:
But the California decision, made on a demurrer, was an authorita-
tive determination only as to those claims which Kurlan had pleaded
in the California action, not as to what he had but did not plead.
What Kurlan may well have had in addition were infringement
claims to vindicate the radio and television rights secured byMcKenny’s
federal copyright. It is immaterial whether Kurlan’s attorney omitted
these claims in the California complaint because he lacked faith in
them or because he feared that they were outside state court jurisdic-
tion. (citation omitted). Although the federal copyright did not con-
fer a monopoly of the pretty-but-dumb and plain-but-bright
combination, which was in the public domain, CBS’ presentation may
have approached the McKenny characters and their development so
closely as to have infringed. (citations omitted). CBS evidently thought
so: its lawyers insisted on a broad release of all claims for infringe-
ment, in which McKenny joined.
. . . .
. . . The Settlement did not convey to CBS any interest in the copy-
right; Kurlan and McKenney simply released claims for past infringe-
ment and allowed similar future radio or television use by CBS,
retaining their rights against all others.28
While the Court’s discussion of the reasons why the case was not filed in
Federal Court suggest that Kurlan’s counsel agreed with the conclusions reached
by the state courts—that the publication of McKenny’s works had placed the
characters and their story lines into the public domain, another doctrine of
copyright law, known as scenes a faire, may also have led Kurlan and his coun-
sel to hew to the contract, quasi-contract, and tort theories of misappropria-
tion as the basis for the complaint. The doctrine of scenes a faire precludes a
grant of copyright protection if the work in question is principally composed
of common genre elements, as opposed to new, creative expressions. The doc-
trine is well summarized by the Ninth Circuit in its opinion in Ets-Hokin v.
Skyy Spirits, Inc.29 Chief Judge Schroeder, writing for the unanimous Court in
that case, explained the doctrine thusly: “[W]hen similar features of a work
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are ‘as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment
of a given idea, they are treated like ideas and are therefore not protected by
copyright.’ ”30
While we may never know exactly why Kurlan and his counsel chose not to
pursue remedies in federal court, one benefit of that decision was that it gave
Justice Carter an opportunity to review and consider these issues, an oppor-
tunity rarely afforded to state court judges given the preemption doctrine which
limits adjudication of copyright law issues to the federal court system.31
A significant benefit resulting from Judge Carter’s analysis of this case is his
discussion of the impact the doctrine of “limited publication” has on Kurlan’s
claim. As the majority noted, Section 983 of the California Civil Code divests
creators of works of their rights of control where they intentionally offer the
work to the public.32 However, Justice Carter argued that where the evidence
establishes that the creator of the work licensed its use subject to restrictions
as to the scope of the license, such a publication is “known as a restricted or
limited publication.”33
The Doctrine of Limited Publication
The doctrine of limited publication, like other copyright doctrines (fair use,
for example), is a doctrine laden with controversial, conflicting, and often in-
consistent applications. Courts struggle with whether face patterns suggest that
an author intended to retain rights to their work or to fully dedicate their work
to public domain.
A classic example of this struggle is found in the cases which dealt with
ownership of the rights to the famous and historic I Have a Dream speech, de-
livered by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on August 28, 1968, during the March
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on Washington and sponsored by the Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence (SCLC) to promote the civil rights movement. The SCLC, which wanted
wide press coverage of the March and the speech, sent copies of the text of the
speech to media outlets, and allowed live broadcasts of the speech on televi-
sion and radio.
Shortly after the speech was delivered, an enterprising record company man-
ufactured and distributed sound recordings of the speech. Dr. King brought
a copyright infringement action, King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) to enjoin the sale of the recordings. The district court found
that the widespread distribution to the press and broadcast, and general media
coverage, of the speech did not constitute “publication” for purposes of Copy-
right law, and granted the injunction.34
This decision has, for many years, been subject to severe criticism. One
commentator characterized the efforts made by the district court as “pretzel-
like contortions to avoid forfeiture” and noted: “A more results-oriented law and
facts be damned opinion would be hard to find.”35 It took 35 years before the
legal system would get a second opportunity to clarify the limited publication
doctrine as it applied to the King speech.
In 1998 the King Estate, relying on the Maestro decision, sought another
injunction, this time against CBS, Inc., alleging that in producing a video doc-
umentary that used excerpts of the speech without authorization CBS had in-
fringed on the copyright to the work held by the Estate. The district court
granted summary judgment for CBS, finding that the distribution to the media,
and subsequent broadcast of the speech, was a general publication that placed
the speech into the public domain.36
The district court erred, however, by asserting in part that Dr. King’s pub-
lic delivery of the speech inWashington was a factor in determining that a gen-
eral publication of the work had occurred. The district court should have
considered Justice Carter’s dissent in Kurlan, wherein he stated the long-es-
tablished principle that the public performance of a work, without any con-
current distribution of hard copies that could be retained by the public, is not
a general publication and does not give rise to a forfeiture.37
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The King Estate appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court, holding that sufficient issues of fact existed as to
whether the nature and extent of the distribution of copies of the work would
constitute evidence of a general publication that dedicated the work to the
public domain.38 Citing the Maestro decision, among others, the court held
that the distribution of copies to the press was a limited, and not a general,
publication.39 The case was remanded for further proceedings in the district court,40
and the parties later entered into a private settlement of the matter.
The importance and validity of the doctrine of limited publication, whose
application was urged by Justice Carter in his Kurlan dissent, was therefore
reaffirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in this decision, suggesting that Justice
Carter was right to support its application in Kurlan, and that his dissenting
viewpoint should have been adopted by the majority.
A Prescient Approach—Characters Deserve Separate Protection
When the subject of a literary work, television show, or motion picture in-
cludes a story line that focuses on a distinctive character, such as Arthur Conan
Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, or Patricia Cornwell’s Kay Scarpetta, it creates an
interesting question for copyright law—can the character be granted copy-
right protection separate from the story in which they appear?
In Kurlan, the majority opinion sidesteps this issue, stating:
It is suggested, however, that McKenney retained the right to use
the characters “Ruth” and “Eileen” in sequels to the original stories.
The implication is that no one else could acquire this right. But even
if we assume that characterizations may be protectable, these charac-
ters were products of the mind which intentionally had been made
public. Under the circumstances, there was nothing to prevent McKen-
ney or anyone else from utilizing them in other productions.41
In his dissent, Justice Carter made a strong argument that characters should
be the subject of separate protectible property interests:
Characters and characterizations which are products of the mind
should be held to be protectible property interests. . . . It is surely a sub-
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ject of judicial notice that California is the center of the motion pic-
ture industry of the world and if its laws are inadequate for the pro-
tection of the individual creative writer who must find a market for his
work, then those laws should be amended.42
Once again, Justice Carter was ahead of his time. The issue of whether to
grant separate copyrights to characters had first been addressed in 1930 by
Judge Learned Hand, in his opinion in the case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp.43 Judge Hand noted that a case in which an effort is made to separately
protect the copyright in characters in a literary work “has never arisen,” and went
on to add that if such a claim were made, it would only be valid if the charac-
ters were well developed: “It follows that the less developed the characters, the
less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for mark-
ing them too indistinctly.”44
The importance of “distinctiveness” to the entitlement to copyright protec-
tion for a character, first articulated here by Judge Hand, is implicitly echoed
by Justice Carter’s discussion of this issue. While Justice Carter does not specif-
ically address this point, he gives a list of then popular characters as examples
of the value they have to their creators and owners. Some of those listed are still
extremely valuable today (e.g., Superman, Sherlock Holmes, and Blondie)—
and have, because of their distinctiveness, obtained the protection of copy-
right which Justice Carter believed they were entitled to.45
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Prescient Again—NewMedia Delivery Formats
Require Separate Licenses
Over the past 35 years, the ubiquitous proliferation of personal comput-
ers, and related items incorporating digital technology, have led to the creation
of a number of different media delivery platforms through which we can
watch, listen to, and even interact with creative entertainment content. One
of the challenges these developments pose for copyright law is whether rights
granted for use of a work in one media platform are transferable to a newly
developed platform, or whether the new platform requires a new license or per-
mission to use the work. This question has been raised in a case where the
creator of the children’s story character Curious George sued a video pro-
ducer for infringement when he manufactured and sold video copies of a se-
ries of short television programs depicting the character;46 in a case where the
release of a famous Alfred Hitchcock/Jimmy Stewart film, Rear Window, was
released on videocassette;47 and in a case where freelance writers for the New
York Times Magazine successfully established that the conversion of articles
they wrote and published in the magazine to an online digital archive created
by the Times was a separate use for which a separate license should have been
obtained.48
Once again, in his dissent in Kurlan, Justice Carter anticipated this devel-
oping body of law, and correctly assessed its outcome—in case after case which
followed his dissent, courts have held that new media creates new rights for
authors. As Justice Carter put it:
There is nothing new in a play broadcast over the air, but there is
something new in a play broadcast over the air for the first time if the
author of that play has reserved the radio rights thereto, because the
play is being used in a medium new to it.49
Justice Carter understood that when a work of the mind was presented in dif-
ferent mediums, the creator and owner of that work was entitled to control
the circumstances of that new presentation, and to be compensated fairly for
this new use.
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Conclusion
As noted at the beginning of this brief chapter, state courts rarely address
issues relating to copyright law—a body of law primarily encountered in fed-
eral court. What is even more rare is for a judge, in a dissenting opinion, to
express prescient views regarding important issues that were in their nascent
stages at the time of the drafting of his opinion. Justice Carter’s well deserved
reputation for insightful and creative approaches to the law is further bur-
nished by his dissent in the Kurlan case.
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